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IMPROVING AGENCIES’ PREEMPTION
EXPERTISE WITH CHEVMORE CODIFICATION
Kent Barnett*
INTRODUCTION
After nearly thirty years, the judicially crafted Chevron1 and Skidmore2
judicial-review doctrines have found new life as exotic, yet familiar,
legislative tools. When Chevron deference applies, courts employ two
steps: they consider whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous,
and, if so, they defer to an administering agency‘s reasonable
interpretation.3 Skidmore deference, in contrast, is a less deferential regime
in which courts assume interpretative primacy over statutory ambiguities
but defer to agency action based on four factors—the agency‘s
thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and overall persuasiveness.4 In the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,5 Congress
directed courts to review the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency‘s
(OCC) decisions to preempt state law under Skidmore‘s four criteria.6 It
also provided a savings clause that permitted Chevron deference for other
OCC determinations.7 This was the first time that Congress codified either
Skidmore or Chevron. By doing so, Congress itself used the judicially
choreographed Chevron two-step and Skidmore quadrille—to which I refer
collectively as Chevmore8—to inform ongoing debates in administrative
law.9

* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate helpful comments
from Mehrsa Baradaran, Bo Rutledge, Catherine Sharkey, Chris Walker, Art Wilmarth, and
the participants at the University of Georgia School of Law‘s junior faculty workshop. I also
very much appreciate suggestions from the symposium participants in Chevron at 30:
Looking Back and Looking Forward at Fordham University School of Law on March 7,
2014.
1. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
3. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
4. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
5. Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
6. See infra Part II.B.1.
7. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(B) (2012).
8. I use the portmanteau Chevmore to distinguish these two judicially crafted judicialreview doctrines from other judicial-review standards, such as those in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
9. In a forthcoming article, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2015), I consider the broader implications of, and other uses for, Chevmore codification.

587

588

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

In this Essay for the Fordham Law Review symposium Chevron at 30:
Looking Back and Looking Forward, I focus on one way in which
Chevmore codification can improve administrative law: encouraging
agencies to improve their expertise in preempting state law (or ―agency
preemption‖).10 To do so, I present a case study of Congress‘s response to
the OCC‘s controversial preemption of state consumer-protection law. I
begin in Part I by focusing on administrative expertise‘s role in Chevmore
deference generally11 and in agency preemption specifically.12 With
expertise‘s doctrinal and normative place in mind, I explain in Part II.A
that, because of the OCC‘s conflicts of interest and purported status as a
―captured‖ agency, the agency‘s broad preemption rulings were most likely
not the product of agency expertise. I continue in Part II.B to argue that,
with Dodd-Frank‘s substantive and procedural preemption provisions
(including its codified Skidmore provision), Congress did more than
establish its disapproval of the OCC‘s broad preemption rulings. Instead, it
confronted the conflict and capture concerns by encouraging the OCC to
develop and use its preemption expertise. It did so by codifying the
appropriate preemption standard, establishing various procedural
requirements for the OCC to support its decisions with data, and limiting
judicial deference (through Skidmore codification) to the OCC‘s
preemption decisions.
Despite Congress‘s largely successful attempt to encourage agency
expertise, I briefly conclude in Part II.C by considering how Congress can
further improve agencies‘ expertise as to preemption specifically and other
matters generally. Congress can lead agencies to consider how their
technical and administrative expertise interacts with federalism values by
requiring the agencies to consider those values and consult with affected
parties. Congress can also use Chevmore codification to improve agencies‘
use of technical and administrative expertise both in and outside of the
preemption context by allowing agencies to exchange Skidmore deference
for Chevron deference when they develop and apply their expertise to
certain matters.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
Before discussing the OCC‘s preemption history and Skidmore‘s
codification, this Essay considers how expertise does and should inform
judicial review generally and agency preemption specifically.

10. For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker,
Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475
(2014).
11. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1986); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV.
1271, 1310–11 (2008); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations,
Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737
(2002).
12. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737
(2004).
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A. Expertise and Chevmore
Expertise is and should be a necessary criterion for all judicial deference
to agency action, including for Chevron deference. From a descriptive
standpoint, expertise matters under current doctrine. The U.S. Supreme
Court, although often focusing on several values in determining whether to
defer to agency action,13 consistently invokes agency expertise as a guiding
value. Skidmore deference, for instance, is grounded primarily on expertise,
while Chevron deference relies upon expertise to inform whether Congress
intended an agency to receive interpretive primacy. And from a normative
perspective, expertise should inform judicial review because it justifies the
administrative state.
Skidmore deference (or the lack thereof) focuses on administrative
expertise. In Skidmore, the Court reviewed whether certain employees were
entitled to overtime pay and related damages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act14 (FLSA).15 The Labor Department had provided its
interpretation of the statute that required a ―flexible‖ analysis to determine
when overtime was due.16 The Court held that an agency‘s interpretation is
entitled to deference, even if not controlling on the courts, if it represents a
―body of experience and informed judgment.‖17 Deference depends upon
the agency‘s use of expertise, as evidenced by ―the thoroughness evident in
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade.‖18 Indeed, the Court in United States v. Mead19 held that the
music for a Skidmore quadrille begins when ―the regulatory scheme is
highly detailed . . . [and the agency] can bring the benefit of specialized
experience to bear.‖20 In short, as leading scholars have noted, the
existence and use of agency expertise are central to Skidmore deference.21
Expertise is likewise germane to Chevron deference, even if it only
informs whether Congress wants an agency to assume interpretive primacy
over ambiguous statutory provisions that the agency administers. The
Court in Chevron relied primarily upon a delegation theory—namely, that
13. See generally Criddle, supra note 11.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
15. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135–36 (1944).
16. Id. at 138.
17. Id. at 140.
18. Id.
19. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
20. Id. at 235.
21. See A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland, 472 F.3d 148, 169 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying an
agency Skidmore deference because the agency had ―developed virtually no experience that
might be considered a ‗body of experience and informed judgment‘‖ (quoting Skidmore, 323
U.S. at 140)); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1293 (2007) (noting ―comparative agency
expertise and the potential for arbitrariness in the exercise of that expertise‖ are central to
Skidmore); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
855 (2001) (―Under Skidmore, however, it does not matter whether Congress has delegated
authority to an agency to administer the statute as long as the agency has relevant
expertise.‖).
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Congress delegated power to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to create binding interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms—in deferring
to the EPA‘s interpretation of an ambiguous term within the Clean Air
Act.22 Determining whether Congress delegated authority to the agency
requires courts to consider congressional intent.23 The Chevron Court
concluded that Congress could reasonably think that agencies with their
―great expertise‖ are in a better position to fill statutory gaps than courts.24
Expertise, accordingly, informed whether Congress intended to delegate
interpretive primacy to an agency.25
Almost two decades later, the Court in United States v. Mead suggested
that expertise was not germane to Chevron deference.26 There, the Court
determined that Chevron should not apply to certain Customs Service ruling
letters because Congress had not intended to delegate interpretive primacy
to the agency when it exercised its authority through informal means that
lacked the force of law.27 In focusing on the formality of the agency action,
the Court stated that ―generally . . . Congress contemplates administrative
action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal
administrative procedure,‖ and pointed to notice-and-comment rulemaking
and formal adjudication as generally sufficient.28 The Court relegated its
discussion of expertise to its consideration of Skidmore deference.29
Notwithstanding Mead‘s suggestion that expertise was irrelevant to
Chevron deference,30 Professor Evan Criddle contends that the Court has
continued to consider expertise after Mead.31 For instance, the Court relied
upon the Attorney General‘s lack of expertise in medical ethics when
refusing to grant him Chevron deference for an interpretive rule concerning
euthanasia.32 The official‘s lack of relevant expertise undermined the
argument that Congress had delegated lawmaking power to him.33
22. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45
(1984); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012).
23. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2646 (2003).
24. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
25. Id. at 865–66; John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77
TEX. L. REV. 113, 191 (1998) (―[T]he Court ultimately supported its deference principle [in
Chevron] with two intertwined policy reasons—agency expertise and democratic
accountability . . . .‖).
26. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
27. See id. at 231–33; see also Criddle, supra note 11, at 1274 (―[T]he Supreme
Court . . . expressly ground[ed] Chevron in the congressional delegation theory.‖).
28. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230–31.
29. Id. at 234–35.
30. See Criddle, supra note 11, at 1301–02 (discussing Mead‘s impact on ―consensus
view‖); Garrett, supra note 23, at 2637 (referring to delegation theory as ―consensus view‖
of Chevron).
31. See generally Criddle, supra note 11. But see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2137 (2002) (―Chevron deference does
not depend on any showing of agency expertise . . . .‖).
32. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266–67 (2006).
33. Moreover, the Gonzales Court refused to defer to the Attorney General‘s
interpretation of a regulation per Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). See Gonzales, 546
U.S. at 256–57. The regulation merely parroted the statutory language, ―instead of using
[the official or agency‘s] expertise and experience to formulate a regulation.‖ Id. at 257. The
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Conversely, in awarding Chevron deference to the Labor Department in
Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,34 the Court relied upon the
agency‘s expertise in deciding that Congress had delegated lawmaking
authority to the Department to interpret the FLSA‘s overtime and
minimum-wage provisions.35 Indeed, after their comprehensive empirical
study of the Supreme Court‘s use of deference doctrines since Chevron,
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer concluded that the application of
specialized agency expertise may be the ―most significant variable‖ in
influencing whether the Supreme Court defers to agency action.36
Considering expertise for both Skidmore and Chevron makes sense.
Agencies‘ raison d’être is to provide a font of expertise to advise Congress
and to administer a complex and often technical statutory scheme in an
ever-growing federal bureaucracy.37 Agency expertise can take different
(yet overlapping) forms. Agencies may develop ―administrative expertise‖
by having repeated experience with regulated and benefited parties in
administering a statutory scheme and regularly confronting (and learning
from) new issues that arise.38 They can also have ―technical expertise‖
concerning the jargon and nature of the particular regulated industry,
including the scientific or economic considerations that inform and impact
how a regulated industry operates.39
Agencies, too, may acquire
Court‘s reliance on expertise is meaningful for both Auer and Chevron deference—despite
the former doctrine‘s concern with deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous
regulations, as opposed to statutes—because ―[i]n practice, Auer deference is Chevron
deference applied to regulations rather than statutes.‖ Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S.
Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
34. 551 U.S. 158, 165, 167–68 (2007).
35. Id. at 165; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of
Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2015–18 (2011) (noting that the Court in
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991), considered the comparative expertise of two
agencies in deciding to which agency Congress delegated interpretive authority for agency
regulations); Garrett, supra note 23, at 2649 (arguing expertise should be germane to
delegation).
36. William N. Eskridge & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1180 (2008); see also Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An
Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 270 (1986) (noting that
expertise is a ―significant variable‖ in determining judicial deference).
37. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 681 (1996) (―Congress‘s decision
to commit lawmaking power to agencies vests substantial regulatory authority in specialized
bodies with knowledge, expertise, and experience that generalist courts lack. Agencies may
therefore have insights into regulatory history, context, or purpose that may not be readily
apparent to even the most seasoned federal judge.‖); Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and
the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL‘Y 131, 174
(2013) (―[O]ne need only recall the reasons why Congress creates administrative
agencies . . . in the first place: Congress lacks the time and expertise to make every decision
itself . . . .‖).
38. See Breyer, supra note 11, at 368 (―At a minimum, the agency staff understands the
sorts of interpretations needed to ‗make the statute work.‘‖); Criddle, supra note 11, at
1286–87.
39. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial
Review As Transaction of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756 (2011); Edward L.
Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons from the
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―legislative expertise‖—i.e., insight into legislative history and
congressional intent—because they often have a hand in advising Congress
in drafting and revising legislation.40 Expertise, as central to agencies‘ very
existence, rightly influences judicial deference and the nature or extent of
congressional delegation.41
To be sure, expertise should not assume talismanic dimension, where its
invocation provides agencies carte blanche. Even when technical in nature,
expertise is not always an objective matter.42
Agency decisions,
masquerading as expertise,43 can arise from political considerations,44
faulty assumptions, or improper biases.45 These failings will likely never
be cured because of human nature, changing agency incentives, and the
varied matters that agencies must decide.
That said, expertise‘s perceived failings may be exaggerated by turning
expertise into something that it is not. In any of its forms, expertise may
not always be scientific, quantitative, or objective.46 Instead, like lawyerly
expertise, agency expertise includes the acquisition of considered (and often
subjective) judgment, i.e., the ability to predict likely outcomes, recognize
relevant issues and uncertainties, and reach sensible conclusions based often

Payment System, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1267 (1989) (noting that merely speaking the
language of industry is a key form of administrative expertise).
40. Breyer, supra note 11, at 368; accord Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 485 (1981)
(―[T]he Bureau [of Prisons]‘s interpretation of the statute merits greater than normal weight
because it was the Bureau that drafted the legislation and steered it through Congress with
little debate.‖); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 36, at 1173.
41. These forms of agency expertise have long informed another judicial-review
standard: whether agency action is ―arbitrary or capricious‖ under the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (2012). See Bressman, supra note 35, at 2042–43 (noting that political scientists
have argued that agency expertise influences congressional delegation); Krotoszynski, supra
note 11, at 755.
42. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 524 (1989) (―We have gradually become
disillusioned with the idea that regulatory policy dilemmas have an objectively ‗correct‘
answer, discernible through the aggregation of enough information and the application of
enough expertise.‖).
43. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference
Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1809 (2012) (―[S]cholars have demonstrated that agencies
sometimes cloak policy judgments in a shroud of science to avoid accountability and achieve
more deferential judicial review.‖).
44. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 18–19 (2009) (referring to political considerations in agency
decision making).
45. See Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 816–27
(2013) (discussing due process and bias concerns surrounding federal administrative law
judges); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 36, at 1173 (noting perception of agency bias affects
agency‘s institutional advantage). Indeed, one study concerning the FTC‘s antitrust
decisions suggests that agencies may not have more expertise than generalist federal courts.
See generally Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform
Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission,
1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 82 (2013).
46. See Greater Bos. Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (―[A]gency
matters typically involve a kind of expertise—sometimes technical in a scientific sense,
sometimes more a matter of specialization in kinds of regulatory programs.‖).

2014] AGENCY PREEMPTION EXPERTISE AND CHEVMORE

593

on repeated confrontations with particular scenarios.47 This judgment—
developed, among other ways, through repeated litigation, solicitation of
public comment, pilot studies, modification of prior rules,48 and at times an
―administration‘s views of wise policy‖49—can and often should inform
agency action.
Moreover, limiting the proper scope of agency expertise can largely
mitigate expertise‘s shortcomings.
Congress or courts can define
substantive considerations to cabin the agency‘s discretion and harness the
agency‘s judgment that arises from experience and knowledge, especially
when an equation or experiment fails to provide a definitive answer.
Congress can also provide procedural requirements—such as Mead‘s
reliance upon formalized administrative action—to improve agencies‘
exercise of their judgment. When these required procedures allow public
participation (and, in turn, administrative responsiveness to interested
parties‘ concerns), they help inform agencies and assist courts and agencies
in ferreting out decision making that relies on something other than
permissible considerations and agency expertise.50
By doing so,
substantive and procedural limitations provide Congress, as principal, ways
of controlling its agency costs without sacrificing the benefits of
administrative expertise.51

47. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers
in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 774–75 (1991) (―[E]xpertise is reflected
primarily in the assessment of the likely outcomes of policy alternatives.‖); Eskridge & Baer,
supra note 36, at 1174 (recognizing that applying a statute to new circumstances creates
uncertainties that agencies are usually ―much better equipped to handle‖ than courts); Sidney
Shapiro et al., The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for
Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463, 470 (2012) (recognizing the deliberativeconstructive paradigm of administrative law holds that ―experts are not limited to persons
trained in scientific methodologies but include other professionals, particularly lawyers and
public administrators, who rely on qualitative analysis to identify and justify regulatory
solutions‖).
48. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 36, at 1174.
49. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures As Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1765 (2007) (―[Chevron] recognized that politics is a permissible
basis for agency policymaking.‖); Watts, supra note 44, at 8.
50. See Krotoszynski, supra note 11, at 752–53 (noting how public-participation
requirements encourage the use of agency expertise and better ensure that decisions are not
arbitrary); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1444 (1992) (―[A] reasoned explanation ensures that the range of agency
action is . . . supportable by facts in the record, reasonable assumptions, and sound policy
considerations . . . .‖).
51. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1187 (2012) (―[W]henever Congress delegates authority to an
agency, the delegation . . . creates a risk of drift away from the preferences of the
[delegating] lawmakers . . . .‖). Because political accountability and public-participation
values can improve agency decision making, values aside from expertise should also be
relevant to Chevron deference. See Criddle, supra note 11, at 1284–91; see also Peter L.
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1112
(1987) (considering the values of national uniformity that Chevron furthers).
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B. Expertise in Agency Preemption
Agency expertise should also inform the narrower issue of judicial
deference to agency preemption. Without significant discussion, courts
have applied both Chevron and Skidmore when reviewing agencypreemption decisions.52 Prior to Dodd-Frank, Professor Nina Mendelson
persuasively contended that Skidmore should apply53 to agency preemption
because agencies lack expertise in federalism matters.54 Agencies, with
their technical and administrative expertise, can usually determine how state
laws affect statutory schemes that they administer.55 And they may often
use their delegated rulemaking power that has the force of law. But, aside
from lacking clear guidance from Congress as to when they should
preempt,56 agencies often fail to consider political and abstract federalism
values, such as those that seek to protect a state‘s dignity interest or its
ability to serve as a policy ―laboratory.‖57 Agencies‘ failure to do so may
not be surprising because they are unlikely to confront these values
routinely. Yet, even when they could have considered federalism values,
they often have ignored all or some of the nine federalism values that
Federalism Executive Order 13,132 required or advised them to consider.58
Applying Skidmore deference to agency preemption recognizes agencies‘
technical and administrative expertise while accounting for their lack of
experience in weighing federalism values in their preemption analysis.59
Agencies can, however, improve their preemption expertise. Professor
Catherine Sharkey has proposed an ―agency-reference model‖ that calls for
agencies (and courts during judicial review) to focus on what agencies do
best:
use their expertise in collecting and analyzing information,
particularly as it relates to cost-benefit analysis, concerning preemption.60
In later work, she surveyed federal agencies (including the OCC) to
recommend improvements that agencies can make in their agency-

52. Compare Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying the
Chevron framework to the OCC‘s preemption decision (citing Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v.
Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 2005), and Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d
305, 315 (2d Cir. 2005))), with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 576–77 (2009) (applying
Skidmore deference to agency‘s preemption decision). See also Cuomo v. Clearing House
Ass‘n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (applying the Chevron framework to the OCC‘s
preemption of state visitorial powers, but not deferring).
53. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008); Mendelson, supra note 12.
54. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 779.
55. See id. at 779–80.
56. See Mendelson, supra note 53, at 721–22.
57. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 781–82.
58. See id. at 784–86; see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999). Those
values include using preemption only for issues of truly national scope, considering the
states‘ and the people‘s rights to determine the ―moral, political, and legal character of their
lives,‖ treating the states as policy laboratories, and acting with ―the greatest caution‖ when
federal action affects states‘ or localities‘ policymaking discretion. See id. § 2(a)–(i).
59. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 797.
60. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability:
“Agency-Forcing”
Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2153 (2009).
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preemption determinations.61 For instance, she suggests that agencies
develop internal guidelines to determine when rulemakings implicate
federalism concerns and to use empirical evidence to show that state law
impedes federal objectives.62 To permit a more robust federalism debate,
she also recommends better agency consultation with state representatives
by having agencies contact more interested groups and notify state
attorneys general about agency-preemption actions.63 By encouraging
reliance on empirical evidence and engagement with state governments, her
recommendations encourage agencies to use and develop their
administrative and technical expertise when deciding preemption matters by
collecting and considering additional data.
Together, Mendelson‘s and Sharkey‘s scholarship details how agencies
have failed to develop and use their expertise in agency-preemption matters,
suggests that Skidmore deference is appropriate in light of an agency‘s lack
of preemption expertise, and indicates that an agency‘s inexpert status need
not be static. Although Sharkey focuses on how agencies can improve their
preemption decision making, we can rely on her insights to consider how
Congress has improved (and can further improve) administrative expertise
in preemption.
To be sure, as Miriam Seifter‘s valuable contribution to this symposium
argues, applying Skidmore to preemption or federalism questions will
render Chevron‘s ―Step Zero‖—the step at which courts determine whether
Chevron‘s two-step regime applies—more complex and less certain by
excluding a certain kind of agency interpretation from Chevron deference.64
But because Chevron is premised primarily on notions of congressional
intent and delegation,65 one must subjugate concerns over complexity and
certainty to those of congressional intent. Congressional intent as to
delegation is often far from simple and consistent as a general matter.66
But, in the preemption context, there is good reason to think that Congress
does not intend to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies over
preemption matters, and therefore the certainty issues in the preemption
context are not as worrisome as may exist elsewhere. Abbe Gluck and Lisa
Bressman‘s pathbreaking survey of congressional drafters concerning
various administrative law doctrines found that most of the surveyed
drafters asserted that agency preemption of state law is a major policy
question that Congress does not delegate to agencies.67 Likewise, as Chris
61. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521
(2012).
62. See id. at 572, 578–79.
63. See id. at 582–90.
64. See Miriam Seifter, Federalism at Step Zero, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 636–37
(2014).
65. See supra Part I.A.
66. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP.
CT. REV. 201, 223 (2001) (―Congress‘s view on deference (were Congress to consider the
matter) likely would hinge on numerous case-specific and agency-specific variables . . . .‖).
67. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 1004 (2013) (―But of note, 55% of our respondents equated preemption
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Walker‘s contribution to this symposium indicates, surveyed agency rule
drafters mostly thought that Congress does not signal delegation of
preemption questions to agencies through statutory ambiguity (and thus
intend Chevron deference to apply).68 These findings concerning intent
suggest that applying Skidmore to preemption questions is consistent with
congressional intent and thus existing deference doctrines.
II. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO OCC PREEMPTION
The OCC‘s preemption of state consumer-protection laws provides
perhaps the most striking example of inexpertness, preemption, and a
congressional response. The OCC‘s critics charged that the OCC‘s
preemption decisions were driven not by expertise but by the OCC‘s
attempt to aggrandize its own power. Through Dodd-Frank, Congress
sought to improve the OCC‘s agency-preemption expertise in several ways,
including by limiting judicial deference to the OCC with Chevmore
codification. That codification, among other things, can further improve
agency expertise in future legislation.
A. OCC Preemption Before Dodd-Frank
The OCC, an independent agency within the U.S. Treasury
Department,69 administers the National Bank Act70 (NBA) and provides
federal banking charters.71 The Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson72 that the NBA preempts state laws that
―stan[d] as an obstacle‖ to federal objectives, such as empowering federal
banks and ensuring their safety and soundness.73 In later decisions, the
Supreme Court added that the NBA preempts state laws that ―significantly
burden,‖74 ―interfere with,‖75 or ―impair[] or impede[]‖76 it.77
In response to Barnett Bank, the OCC engaged in numerous preemption
activities. Before 2004, it issued numerous preemption legal opinions and
questions with major policy questions, in the sense that they viewed those as not for agencies
to resolve.‖).
68. See Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 721 (2014) (―Finally, regarding preemption of state
law, fewer than half (46 percent) agreed that Congress intends to delegate preemption
questions by ambiguity.‖).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (listing the OCC as an
―independent regulatory agency‖). Although independent agencies are typically defined as
those whose heads the President cannot remove at will, Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769,
772 (2013), the President can remove the Comptroller at will, see 12 U.S.C. § 2.
70. 12 U.S.C. § 38.
71. See 12 C.F.R. § 4.2 (2011).
72. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
73. Id. at 31 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
74. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 13 (2007).
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 21.
77. The NBA does not permit field preemption. See Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912,
921 (9th Cir. 2011).

2014] AGENCY PREEMPTION EXPERTISE AND CHEVMORE

597

interpretive letters concerning national banks.78 But its actions did not
receive widespread attention until 2003 when the OCC preempted many
provisions of the Georgia Fair Lending Act,79 which sought to prevent
common predatory mortgage-lending practices.80 The OCC contended that
it had little evidence that national banks were engaged in predatory
practices and, at any rate, many of the same prohibitions existed under
federal regulations.81 Consumer advocates responded that the OCC had
prevented the states—twenty-eight of which had adopted predatory-lending
prohibitions82—from protecting their citizens, and they saw the OCC‘s sole
concern as banks‘ safety and soundness as opposed to consumer
protection.83 At about the same time, the OCC promulgated an expansive
rule that preempted state laws that ―obstruct, impair, or condition a national
bank‘s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized powers‖ in lending,
taking deposits, and other ―operations.‖84 In response, Congress conducted
hearings to determine whether the OCC had acted contrary to congressional
intent85 and whether the regulation‘s preemption—especially with the
―condition‖ concept—was broader than the Barnett Bank standard.86
Ultimately, the Supreme Court expressed its lack of confidence in the OCC
when it rejected the OCC‘s preemption of state visitorial powers over
national banks.87
Three considerations suggest that the OCC‘s preemption decisions were
not products of agency expertise. First, the OCC has a conflict of interest in
78. See Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd-Frank Act and National Bank
Preemption: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 318–20 (2012)
(identifying preemption concerning banking branches, offices, ATM locations, loan
products, and fees).
79. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1 (2012).
80. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 320.
81. See id.; Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can
Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 526–27 (2007).
82. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 324.
83. See, e.g., Brief of AARP et al. As Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12,
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (No. 05–1342), 2006 WL 2570989, at
*11; Amanda Quester & Kathleen Keest, Looking Ahead After Watters v. Wachovia Bank:
Challenges for Lower Courts, Congress, and the Comptroller of the Currency, 27 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 187, 195 (2007); Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory
Preemption of Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2274, 2304 (2004). For its part,
the OCC denies that it has ignored consumer protection. See Mark E. Budnitz, The
Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States:
Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 673 n.50 (2008).
84. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 553–54 (quoting Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v.
Clearing House: The Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and
Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, in THE
PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 305 (Lawrence E.
Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010)).
85. See id.
86. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 322; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services,
36 J. CORP. L. 893, 936 (2011).
87. See Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, LLC, 557 U.S. 519, 535–36 (2009). See
generally Wilmarth, supra note 84.
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preempting state law.88
Former Comptroller John Hawke, Jr.,
acknowledged that the OCC used agency preemption to attract chartering
entities (from competitors such as the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
and state agencies).89 Attracting and retaining banking entities is important
to the OCC because it receives almost all of its funding from chartered
entities, not taxpayers.90 Second, regulated parties reputedly have captured
the OCC and have used it to limit their liability under various state laws.91
Regulatory capture undermines expert decision making because the agency
becomes persistently biased in favor of the captor (usually the regulated
industry).92 Indeed, the conflicted and captured OCC appeared to focus on
preemption as a ―tool for conducting nationwide business,‖93 ignoring data
and other values that are germane to preemption, such as corrective
justice,94 regulatory efficiency,95 and states‘ authority, dignity, and policy
experimentation.96 For example, the OCC‘s revision to its 2004 Visitorial
Powers Rule and notice of proposed rulemaking contained ―no factual
findings . . . explaining why preemption was necessary in the specific case
or what conflicts between state authorities and federal banks justified
preemption.‖97 Likewise, the OCC‘s lengthy explanation in preempting
Georgia‘s Fair Lending Act failed to engage in any significant discussion of
federalism values.98 Third, the OCC‘s process for preemption rulemaking
may not provide adequate assurances that agency expertise influences
federalism questions. OCC preemption rulings are generally no different
than other rulemakings, have internal guidelines that are ―a bit out of date,‖
and rely upon mere ―informal[]‖ agency supervision.99 The Government
Accountability Office found that the OCC inadequately consulted with
88. See Mendelson, supra note 53, at 722 (noting that agency self-interest can impede
agency‘s consideration of states‘ interest); accord Mendelson, supra note 12, at 794–95.
89. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16 (2010); accord Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s
Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual
Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 232
(2004); see also Mendelson, supra note 53, at 715 (noting that strong obstacle preemption
prevents state competition). Indeed, U.S. Bancorp CEO Richard Davis stated that the OCC‘s
preemption power was the banking industry‘s ―number one concern‖ with Dodd-Frank. See
Chris Serres, Bill Has Banks Fearing Power of the States, STAR TRIBUNE (Mar. 16, 2010,
11:35 PM), http://www.startribune.com/business/87956447.html.
90. See Wilmarth, supra note 89, at 232.
91. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) (referring to amici briefs in Cuomo, 557 U.S. 519).
92. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 21–22 (2010).
93. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 555 (quoting OCC officials).
94. See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 227–
28 (2011).
95. See id.
96. Mendelson, supra note 12, at 781–82.
97. Sharkey, supra note 61, at 581. The OCC had engaged in some factual discussion
concerning whether depository institutions engaged in predatory lending when preempting
Georgia‘s Fair Lending Act. See OCC, Preemption Determination & Order, 68 Fed. Reg.
46,264, 46,271–72 (Aug. 5, 2003).
98. See generally OCC, Preemption Determination & Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug.
5, 2003).
99. Sharkey, supra note 61, at 576–77 (quoting OCC officials).
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affected groups (such as states and consumer advocates), failed to document
these consultations,100 and failed to provide sufficiently detailed internal
guidance for preemption rulemaking.101
B. Encouraging Agency-Preemption Expertise
In response to the OCC‘s flawed preemption rulings,102 Dodd-Frank
sought to address state-law preemption standards that govern national banks
and their subsidiaries in 12 U.S.C. § 25b.
Despite the Obama
Administration‘s call to abolish the OCC‘s preemption authority,103
Congress took a more modest, yet pathbreaking, approach to encourage
better agency preemption. Dodd-Frank provides a preemption standard,
judicial review standards, and various procedures for the OCC to follow
when seeking to preempt certain state consumer-protection laws.
1. Dodd-Frank and Chevmore Codification
The relevant preemption provisions apply primarily to ―state consumer
financial laws.‖104 Those laws directly regulate consumer financial
transactions and do not discriminate against national banks.105 Dodd-Frank
preempts them only if, among other reasons, they ―prevent[] or significantly
interfere[] with the exercise by the national bank of its powers‖ in accord
―with the legal standard for preemption in . . . Barnett Bank.‖106
The Act contains several procedural requirements for agency preemption.
The preemption determination may be made by a court or ―by regulation or
order of the [Comptroller107] on a case-by-case basis.‖108 ―Case-by-case
basis‖ refers to the OCC‘s ―determination . . . concerning the impact of a
particular State consumer financial law on any national bank . . . or the law
of any other State with substantively equivalent terms.‖109 The Comptroller
must consult with and consider the views of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB).110 ―Substantial evidence, made on the record of

100. Id. at 582–83.
101. See id. at 576.
102. See, e.g., James A. Huizinga et al., OCC Moves to Implement Dodd-Frank Act
Preemption Provisions, 128 BANKING L.J. 755, 758 (2011) (referring to letters to the OCC
from Rep. Barney Frank, Sen. Mark Warner, and Sen. Tom Carper expressing concerns
about the OCC‘s preemption rulings).
103. See Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 341 n.231 (referring to U.S. DEP‘T OF THE
TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 61 (2009) and H.R.
3126, 111th Cong. § 143 (2009)).
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b) (2012).
105. See id. § 25b(a)(2).
106. Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
107. Section 25b(b)(6) provides that ―[a]ny regulation, order, or determination made by
the Comptroller . . . under paragraph (1)(B) shall be made by the Comptroller, and shall not
be delegable . . . .‖
108. Id. § 25b(b)(1)(B). The rule or order must be made ―in accordance with applicable
law,‖ presumably including the APA. See id.
109. Id. § 25b(b)(3)(A).
110. See id. § 25b(b)(3)(B).
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the proceeding,‖ must support the regulation or order.111 Every five years
thereafter, the OCC must reconsider—through notice-and-comment
proceedings—whether preemption is still necessary and report to
Congress.112 The OCC must also publish at least quarterly a list of
preemption determinations and identify affected activities and practices.113
When reviewing the OCC‘s preemption determinations, Congress
commanded courts to apply the four Skidmore factors.114 A savings clause
clarifies that the codified Skidmore standard for preemption rulings,
however, does not apply to other OCC interpretations of the NBA.115 The
codification of the Chevmore doctrines appears intentional because the
House, before sending its bill to the Senate, revised the original bill from
providing no deference for preemption determinations116 to providing
Skidmore deference117 and rejected an amendment that would have likely
allowed Chevron to apply.118 The relevant Senate Committee Report
described concerns regarding the OCC‘s conflict of interest in using
preemption as a tool for fee generation119 and noted that Chevron deference
would no longer apply to the OCC‘s preemption decisions.120
2. How Congress Focused on Expertise
Congress‘s handiwork in § 25b may be best understood as attempting to
develop and encourage the OCC‘s use of technical and administrative
expertise in agency preemption. I consider below five key ways in which
Congress did so, including by codifying Skidmore.
First, Congress requires the OCC to support its preemption rulings with
data. The OCC must develop a factual record because it must have
―substantial evidence, made on the record of the proceeding.‖ The use of

111. See id. § 25b(c).
112. See id. § 25b(d)(1)–(2).
113. See id. § 25b(g).
114. More specifically, Skidmore deference extends to ―any determinations made by the
Comptroller regarding preemption of a State law by title 62 of the Revised Statutes or [12
U.S.C. § 371],‖ not merely state consumer financial laws. Id. § 25b(b)(5)(A) (emphasis
added).
115. See id. § 25b(5)(B).
116. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(4) (as reported by H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 1st Sess., 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173ih/
pdf/BILLS-111hr4173ih.pdf.
117. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 5136C(b)(5)(A) (as passed by House, 1st Sess., 2009),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4173ih/pdf/BILLS111hr4173ih.pdf.
118. See 155 CONG. REC. E3029 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 2009) (statement of Rep. Melissa
Bean) (―[W]hen a court is reviewing an OCC determination concerning the proper
interpretation of the [NBA] or other Federal law that the OCC is charged with administering,
the court is to apply the traditional deference accorded to an agency, often referred to as
‗Chevron‘ deference.‖). Representative Bean‘s manager‘s amendment had no specific
provision for deference to agency preemption. See Amend. No. 141 to H.R. 4173 (Dec. 9,
2009) (Offered by Rep. Bean of Ill.).
119. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16 (2010).
120. See id. at 176.
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the Administrative Procedure Act‘s121 (APA) ―substantial evidence‖
standard (as opposed to its arbitrary and capricious standard, which would
normally apply to informal proceedings) is telling because ―substantial
evidence‖ primarily focuses on factual findings and their implications, as
opposed to discretionary policy judgments,122 and constitutes ―a
considerably more generous judicial review‖ standard.123 Indeed, OCC
officials after Dodd-Frank are ―aware that proffering evidence in support of
preemption enhances the likelihood that a court will adopt its preemption
conclusions.‖124
Relatedly, Congress requires that parties have the ability to participate in
perhaps extremely formalized proceedings. The OCC must place its
substantial evidence ―on the record‖ after some kind of administrative
proceeding, indicating that the OCC must provide interested parties an
opportunity to respond to the Agency‘s position and provide supporting or
contrary comments and evidence that expand the administrative record.
Because these opportunities generally arise in (but are not limited to) formal
adjudication and formal and informal substantive rulemakings,125 the
OCC‘s ability to promulgate guidance documents, opinion letters, or other
forms of informal or interagency decision making appears significantly
constrained, if not prohibited, for preemption rulings. Indeed, Congress‘s
use of the ―on the record‖ language (which triggers formal proceedings
under the APA), along with its reference to the ―substantial evidence‖
standard that only applies to formal proceedings under the APA, strongly
suggests that the OCC must preempt through formal adjudication or formal
rulemaking under the APA.126
Second, to promote robust debate and data collection and to counter
regulatory capture concerns, Congress has encouraged the CFPB‘s
participation.127 The Comptroller‘s obligation to consult the CFPB and

121. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
122. See Levin, supra note 36, at 253–55, 273–76 (contrasting review of policy
judgments under arbitrary and capricious standard with review of factual findings under
substantial evidence standard).
123. See Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 (1967); Stephanie R. Hoffer &
Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 20 n.138) (citing Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power
Serv.
Corp.,
461
U.S.
402,
412
n.7
(1983)),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2458248_code649541.pdf?abstractid=23
93412&mirid=1 (describing arbitrary and capricious review as ―more lenient‖ to the agency
than substantial evidence review).
124. Sharkey, supra note 61, at 582.
125. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554, 556, 557 (2012); Wilmarth, supra note 86, at 931 (―[T]he
OCC may not make any preemption determination by issuing an opinion letter, court brief or
informal guidance.‖).
126. Sections 553 and 554 of the APA require formal proceedings when Congress calls
for agency action ―on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.‖ The directive in
Dodd-Frank calls for findings ―on the record of the proceeding.‖ Because the Court has
strictly interpreted the APA triggering language, it is not certain that Congress has required
the OCC to proceed through formal proceedings. But if so, it is likely one of the first
instances in which Congress has required formal rulemaking in decades.
127. See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(B) (2012).
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consider its views renders it more likely that the OCC has the input of an
agency focused on consumer protection, as opposed to national banks‘
safety.128 The CFPB may be able to provide (or alert consumer-protection
advocates to provide) the OCC with additional germane data to influence
the OCC‘s preemption decision.129 More cynically, the CFPB‘s presence
(and ability to alert Congress) may also help focus the Agency on the
administrative record (and thus render it more likely that the OCC will use
its expertise) by helping temper the significant bias and interest-group
capture concerns that undermine expert decision making.130
Third, Congress requires the OCC to revisit its earlier preemption
decisions at least every five years (and consider their implications
quarterly).131 These reevaluations require the Agency, after notice and
comment, to determine whether new data or experience undermines the
original preemption determination. Likewise, the OCC‘s duty to report its
periodic evaluations to Congress ensures that Congress—and courts with
Skidmore deference in hand—can oversee whether current data informs the
OCC‘s determination.132
Fourth, Congress has sought to focus and limit the Comptroller‘s
preemption inquiry. The Comptroller herself133 must apply the codified
preemption standard via rule or order on a case-by-case basis to ensure that
she considers the implications of a particular law.134 By narrowing the
Comptroller‘s inquiry and providing procedural requirements for that
inquiry, Congress has rendered it more likely that instead of implementing
broad preemption policies, the Comptroller can develop and identify data to
inform whether the specific state law significantly interferes with national
banks‘ powers.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Congress‘s Skidmore codification
incentivizes agencies to develop and rely upon their technical and
administrative expertise when engaging in agency preemption. Courts, as
discussed in Part I, defer under Skidmore only to the extent that the agency
128. See id.
129. See Barkow, supra note 92, at 52 (―Consultation may bring more experts into the
process and improve decision making by presenting competing viewpoints.‖).
130. See id. at 21–22 (discussing how capture impedes expert decision making); id. at 62
(noting that interagency lobbying can neutralize interest-group influence).
131. See § 25b(d)(1)–(2).
132. These review-and-report provisions also increase the burden of agency preemption,
incentivizing the OCC to limit preemption rulings.
133. The Comptroller‘s inability to delegate ensures that he or she retains full political
accountability for preemption decisions.
134. The substantive preemption standard presents interpretive difficulties. Compare
Natter & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 337–48 (arguing that Dodd-Frank did not materially
alter Barnett Bank or prior OCC standard), with Wilmarth, supra note 86, at 925 (arguing
that ―Dodd-Frank establishes new preemption standards under the NBA‖), and Jared Elosta,
Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the Dodd-Frank Act
Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1299 (2011) (―[Dodd–Frank‘s]
language is notably different from the OCC‘s 2004 [preemption] rule . . . .‖). However,
Congress has at least provided some substantive guidance to the OCC and aligned that
guidance with matters within the agency‘s ken. See Mendelson, supra note 53, at 721–22
(noting that Congress rarely provides agencies clear guidance on preemption).
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employs expertise because they look for determinations that ―constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment.‖135 In short, without
developing and relying upon expertise supported by an administrative
record, the agency is entitled to no deference at all.
3. Why the OCC Was Not Ready for Chevron Deference
Awarding the OCC Chevron deference would likely have been premature
for two reasons. First, conflict-of-interest and capture concerns continue to
surround the OCC, giving the OCC incentive to mask improper purposes as
―expertise.‖ To be sure, Congress ensured some balance to OCC
preemption decision making by requiring the OCC to consult the CFPB.
And Congress likely reduced the OCC‘s conflict of interest by abolishing
another charter-granting federal agency (the OTS).136 But the OCC still
may view preemption as a fee-generating device because the OCC
continues to collect fees from chartered institutions,137 which can otherwise
obtain cheaper state charters.138 Moreover, regulated parties appear to have
significant sway over the OCC after Dodd-Frank because immediately
before the effective date of certain Dodd-Frank provisions, the OCC largely
reaffirmed its preemption determinations without satisfying the procedural
requirements in § 25b.139
The OCC concluded (with almost no
explanation) that by acting before that effective date, it did not need to
comply with § 25b at all.140 Scholars and courts challenged its action as
―flouting‖ those requirements.141 These lingering structural concerns and
recent actions suggest that Congress and courts should be skeptical of OCC
preemption decisions that purport to be products of agency expertise and
thereby support Congress‘s choice to remove the OCC‘s preemption
decisions from Chevron‘s warm embrace.
Second, Dodd-Frank does not require the OCC to consider federalism
values, limiting its ability to develop experience in considering how these
values should influence the Agency‘s reliance on technical and
135. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
136. See Wilmarth, supra note 86, at 896.
137. See OCC, http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last
visited on Oct. 19, 2014) (―[T]he OCC‘s operations are funded primarily by assessments on
national banks and federal savings associations.‖).
138. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking
System, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 263, 273 (1996); accord Christine E. Blair & Rose M.
Kushmeider, Challenges to the Dual Banking System: The Funding of Bank Supervision,
FDIC BANKING REV., Mar. 2006, at 6 (―[T]he assessments for supervision paid by statechartered banks are significantly less than those paid by comparably sized OCC-supervised
banks.‖); see also Mendelson, supra note 53, at 715 (noting that strong obstacle preemption
prevents state competition).
139. See Arthur Wilmarth, OCC Gets It Wrong on Preemption, Again, AM. BANKER (Jul.
28, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/OCC-preemption-Dodd–
Frank-1040692-1.html.
140. See Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76
Fed. Reg. 43,549, 43,557 (July 21, 2011).
141. See Wilmarth, supra note 139 (stating the OCC‘s 2004 preemption rules ―fl[y] in the
face of Dodd-Frank‖). A federal district court has agreed. See Sacco v. Bank of Am., No.
5:12-cv-00006-RLV-DCK, 2012 WL 6566681, at *8 n.7 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 17, 2012).
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administrative expertise in preemption matters. Because Dodd-Frank
turned the OCC into an independent agency,142 the OCC no longer must
comply with the Federalism Executive Order‘s directive to consider
federalism values or consult with states.143 This omission limits the extent
of the OCC‘s inquiry and possibly the input from significantly interested
parties. In short, aside from its historical lack of expertise-driven
determinations, the OCC‘s continuing conflict of interest, its apparent
regulatory capture, and its myopic preemption inquiry all suggest that
Chevron deference was not—at least yet—suitable.
C. Improving Expertise in Agency Preemption
Going forward, Congress can improve an agency‘s use of expertise as to
preemption specifically and other matters generally. Congress can lead
agencies to consider how their technical and administrative expertise
interacts with federalism values by requiring agencies to consider those
values and consult with affected parties. Congress can also improve
agencies‘ use of administrative and technical expertise both inside and
outside of the preemption context by using Chevron deference as a ―carrot‖
for agencies to develop and apply their expertise.
In the agency-preemption context, Congress should expand the kind of
expertise that agencies have in preemption matters. Congress can do so by
requiring agencies to consider how federalism values interact with the
agencies‘ understanding of state laws‘ impact on industry and the federal
statutory scheme.144 These federalism values, found in the well-received
Federalism Executive Order,145 include using preemption only for issues of
truly national scope, considering the states‘ and the people‘s rights to
determine the ―moral, political, and legal character of their lives,‖ treating
the states as policy laboratories, and acting with ―the greatest caution‖ when
federal action affects the states‘ or localities‘ policymaking discretion.146
Codifying these considerations (which are unlikely to be part of agencies‘
daily missions) ensures that they are part of the preemption calculus and
encourages agencies to gain experience in applying their day-to-day
expertise to broader inter-sovereign structural values.
Codifying federalism values will give agencies statutory impetus for
collecting quantitative and qualitative information from states concerning
these values. The federalism values, after all, generally fall on the ―costs‖
side of a preemption cost-benefit ledger, even if they may often be
qualitative in nature, because federal preemption limits the benefits that
142. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 555–56. The OCC is listed as an ―independent
regulatory agency,‖ 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012), but the Comptroller of the Currency is still
subject to the President‘s at-will removal, 12 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
143. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 9, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999); Sharkey, supra note 61, at
555–56.
144. See Mendelson, supra note 12, at 789–90.
145. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 526–27 (―There appears to be consensus that the
requirements of the preemption provisions of E.O. 13132—including consultation with the
states and ‗federalism impact statements‘—are sound.‖).
146. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 2(a)–(i), 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999).
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federalism is thought to provide. Agencies can seek information from
states on, for instance, how a proposed preemptive regulation would likely
affect autonomy interests, whether the states have invested money in statelevel regulatory regimes that would evidence states‘ interest in the field, and
whether states are engaged in innovative or uniform policymaking. After
receiving evidence, the agency can rely upon its administrative and
technical expertise—whether from the agency‘s administration of a
regulatory program or from its staffers‘ work in the private sector—to
evaluate the information and better understand a preempting regulation‘s
effect on state interests. By prompting agencies to receive data on
federalism values and consider them as part of the decision-making process,
agencies can improve their preemption expertise while Congress and courts
acknowledge that ―questions about the appropriate federal-state balance are
not easily separated from substantive policy determinations on which
agencies do have expertise‖ concerning specific regulatory schemes.147
Likewise, Congress should also require consultation with states or stategovernment groups as mandated under the Federalism Executive Order.148
Indeed, Congress has done so in other contexts.149 Additional stakeholders‘
participation in preemption decision making not only encourages intersovereign dialogue (to validate the states‘ dignity interests) but also
provides a way for the agency to obtain (or confront) additional information
and empirical data that even consumer advocates may not have. Such
consultation can improve all facets of agency expertise by broadening the
discussion to include federalism values with affected sovereigns and
obtaining the states‘ regulatory data.
More broadly, both inside and outside the preemption context, Congress
can use Chevmore codification to encourage agencies to engage in public
participation that can lead to a robust exchange of ideas and data. Aside
from requiring an agency to use particular regulatory procedures, Congress
could provide that the use of certain procedures entitles the agency to
Chevron deference. By doing so, Congress could indicate its preference for
procedures that encourage public participation, full administrative records,
the collection and use of data, and expert determinations. As yet another
option, to help give agencies time to develop and demonstrate their ability
to rely upon their expertise, Congress could clarify that Skidmore deference
applies until a certain contingency occurs, at which time Chevron deference
would apply. The contingency could be the promulgation of a certain
number of preemption orders or rules, the promulgation of a certain number
of rulings that have received the courts‘ approval under Skidmore, or a
certain time period (say, after five years of preemption rulings). By using
147. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law As the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2080–82 (2008) (discussing the interrelationship between importance of state dignity
interests and policy considerations).
148. See Sharkey, supra note 61, at 584–86 (recommending that agencies prepare
guidance documents for outreach to affected groups and state representatives).
149. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 5125(b)(2) (2012) (regarding preemption decisions concerning
hazardous materials by the Secretary of Homeland Security).
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Skidmore as a stick and Chevron as a carrot, Congress can encourage
agencies to develop and use their expertise, especially for regulatory
matters in which additional values outside of the regulatory scheme are
important.
This is true even if agencies generally think that Skidmore deference
applies to preemption decisions. Chris Walker asserts that Chevmore
codification may have limited effect on agencies because, according to the
agency personnel that he surveyed, they think that Skidmore and a
presumption against preemption apply to their preemption decisions.150 But
these assumptions only show the value of using Chevron as a carrot.
Having a trigger for Chevron deference that depends on increased agency
expertise not only clarifies Congress‘s intent to delegate (and perhaps to
abrogate the presumption against preemption under certain statutory
schemes), but it also provides the agency incentive to improve its
preemption expertise to obtain more judicial deference. To be sure, the
codification of Skidmore deference for an agency that already thinks that
Skidmore applies would have minimal effect. But my proposal goes further
and suggests that both Skidmore and Chevron can be used together to
influence agency behavior.
CONCLUSION
Chevmore serves as more than a doctrine for courts to invoke when
overseeing the federal administrative state. It has become, instead, a
congressional tool to help resolve concerns over agency preemption and
judicial review thereof. And more broadly, Congress can use Chevmore
codification to reveal its intent as to which values, such as expertise, should
inform appropriate judicial deference to agency action going forward—
especially in the context of agency preemption. In other words, Chevmore,
during the next thirty years, has an innovative new role to play.

150. See Walker, supra note 68, at 721.

